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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
this equitable solution.54* It must clearly appear that the matter, in
regard to which efror has been committed, is entirely distinct and
separate from the matters involved in the other issues, and that the
new trial can be had without -danger of complications as to these other
matters.5s* Therefore in the case under consideration, the negligence
of the defendant being settled, the issue as to the measure of damages
is not so closely allied to those of negligence and contributory negligence
as to require a new trial of the entire case. Had the new trial been
limited to damages much expense and time of the court, the parties,
counsel and witnesses would have been avoided.
JAMES G. HuDsoN, JR.
Legitimation-Bastardy-Effect on Right of Inheritance of Legiti-
mated Child by Subsequent Matriage of Bastard's Parents
In an action brought by the assignee of a granddaughter of an
intestate against his administrators to recover a sum alleged to be due
the granddaughter, as the balance of her share in her grandfather's
estate, a recent Georgia case' held that the granddaughter, born out
of wedlock, was made legitimate for all purposes by the subsequent
marriage of her father and mother and the recognition of the child by
the father as his own, and was entitled to inherit from her grandfather
through her father.
Plaintiff contended that the right of inheritance by the grand-
daughter rested on two Georgia statutes: (1) " * * * The marriage of
the mother and reputed father of an illegitimate child, and the recog-
nition of such child as his, shall render the child legitimate; and in
502, 71 So. 804 (1916); Borough Const. Co. v. City of New York, 200 N. Y.
149, 93 N. E. 480 (1910) ; Pinnix v. L. A. Smithdeal, 182 N. C. 410, 109 S. E. 265(1921) ; Jones v. Insurance Co. of Va., 153 N. C. 388, 69 S. E. 266 (1910) ; Rush-
ing v. Railroad, 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908); Tillett v. Ry. Co., 115 N. C.
616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895); see, Fry v. N. C. Ry. Co., 159 N. C. 357, 366, 74 S.
E. 971, 975 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
"* Torr v. United Rys. of San Francisco, 187 Cal. 505, 202 Pac. 671 (1922)
(Where the verdict for personal injuries is inadequate, the appellate court cannot
merely reverse that portion of the judgment fixing the amount and affirm that
portion fixing the liability of the defendant; but the entire case must be retried.).
"* Rushing Y. Railroad, 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908) ; accord, Dean v.
Bridges, 260 App. Div. 48, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1st Dept., 1940) (Where trial
court rendered verdict for plaintiff for malicious prosecution and false imprison-
ment, there being no separation of damages with respect to the causes of action,
it was held, that if the recovery could not be sustained as to one of these there
must be a reversal as to the entire judgment.); Morrell v. Lallonde, 45 R. I.
112, 120 Atl. 435 (1923) (The question of damages is so closely connected with
and so dependant upon the findings- of facts in issue, that it is impossible to try
the case fairly without presenting it entirely to the jury.) ; Olsen v. Brown, 186
Wis. 179, 202 N. W. 167 (1925) (The perverseness of the jury manifested as to
the question of damages might well have extended to affect the question of the
contributory negligence; thus a new trial should be awarded as to all the issues
involved.).
'Morris v. Dilbeck et al., - Ga. -, 31 S. E. (2d) 93 (1944).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
such case the child shall immediately take the surname of the father." 2
(2) "An illegitimate child, or bastard, is a child born out of wedlock,
and whose parents do not subsequently intermarry. * * *"3 The court
in upholding plaintiff's position stated that ". . . it seems clear that it
was the intention of the law to make the child legitimate for all pur-
poses (Italics supplied.) from the date of its birth."'4
At common law a bastard was said to be filiuw nullius, the son of
no one.5 He could inherit from no one, 6 and none cpi~ld inherit from
him except his direct descendants. The intermarriage of the parents
of an illegitimate child at common law did not legitimate such child;
but by both the civil and canon law the subsequent marriage of the par-
ents legitimized their offspring born before marriage.7 Today, in all of
the fifty-one American jurisdictions the legislatures have provided
means for mitigating the harsh rules of the common law,8 and in all
these jurisdictions are found provisions under which the child may be-
come legitimate by the act of one or both parents.9
North Carolina has provided by statute for the legitimation of bas-
tards by the subsequent marriage' 0 of the mother and the reputed
father."l* Some jurisdictions, including Georgia, 12 require in addition
to the marriage that the father acknowledge the child in order to com-
plete the legitimation. In California's in order to give the child certain
rights of inheritance it is necessary for his parents to have intermar-
ried before his death, and his father acknowledge him as his child, or
"adopt" him into his family.
Ordinarily, the statutes under consideration are declared by the
courts to be remedial and are given a liberal construction.14 While
'GA. CODE ANN. (Park, et al., 1937) tit. 74, §101.
'GA. CODE ANN. (Park, et al., 1937) tit. 74, §201.
'Morris v. Dilbeck et al., - Ga. -, 31 S. E. (2d) 93 (1944).
'Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N. C. 502, 507, 127 S. E. 553, 556, 39 A. L. R. 428,
433 (1925).
' Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346, 350 (1917) ; Houghton et al.
v. Dickinson, 196 Mass. 389, 82 N. E. 481 (1907).
'Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N. C. 502, 505, 127 S. E. 553, 555, 39 A. L. R. 428,
432 (1925).
14 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAmILY LAWS (1936) §242.0 Ibid.
10 As to what constitutes a "marriage" within the meaning of a statute legiti-
mating issue of all marriages null in law, see NoTE (1933) 84 A. L. R. 499.
ll. N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §49-12: "When
the mother of any illegitimate child and the reputed father of such child shall
intermarry or shall have intermarried at any time after the birth of such child,
the child shall in all respects after such intermarriage be deemed and held to be
legitimate and entitled to all the rights in and to the estate, real and personal, of
its father and mother that it would have had had it been born in lawful wedlock."
x, GA. CoDvE ANN. (Park, et al., 1937) tit. 74, §101.
a' CAL. PROB. CODE (Deering, 1941) §255.
"'Haddon v. Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811 (1912) ; Iin re Hoag-
land's Estate, 125 Misc. Rep. 376, 211 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1925) ; James v. James,
253 S. W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 142
S. E. 412 (1928) ; Ash v. Way's Adm'rs et al., 2 Gratt. 203 (Va. 1845).
1944]
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comparatively little direct authority is available as to the right to in.
herit from the kindred of the legitimated person's parents, the prevail-
ing view seems to be that the statutes should be interpreted so as to
permit inheritance of that sort. As early as 1845, it was held that
where a bastard marries, and dies, leaving a legitimate child; and then
the parents of the bastard marry, and the bastard is recognized by the
father as his child both before and after his marriage to her mother,
the illegitimate's child may inherit through his mother from her fa-
ther.15 Since then it has been established in California,O* Kentucky,17 *
Louisiana,l 8" and other jurisdictions' 9 that upon the parents' subse-
quent marriage, a child born before wedlock becomes legitimate for all
purposes20 from the date of its birth. 21 -
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in passing on a similar
problem In re Estate of Wallace22 where the intestate left surviving
him the son of a deceased sister-this nephew being born while his
mother was unmarried; held that the subsequent marriage of the bas-
tard's mother and his reputed father, though legitimizing the child,
simply gave him the right to inherit from his father and mother, and
went no further, thus rejecting his claim to a share as one of the next
of kin of his maternal uncle who had survived the claimant's mother.
It was said that the provisions of C. S., 279,23 "... being in derogation
of the common law . . . should be strictly construed."24  The statute
" Ash v. Way's Adm'rs et al., 2 Gratt. 203 (Va. 1845).
"8*Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346 (1917) (Right to inherit
from grandmother by grandchildren representing deceased father who had been
legitimated was upheld.).
',* Jackson v. Moore, 8 Dana 170 (Ky. 1849) (An antenuptial child who was
legitimated by the parents' marriage and father's recognition, entitled child to
inherit from an uncle, the father's brother.).
18* Cormier et al. v. Cormier et al., 185 La. 968, 171 So. 93 (1936) (By impli-
cation the court held that a grandchild, son of a legitimated father, could repre-
sent his father and inherit from father's parents.); Armant's Succession, 1 La.
App. 258 (1924).
18 Brewer v. Hamor, 83 Me. 251, 22 Atl. 161 (1891); Geisler v. Geisler, 160
Minn. 463, 200 N. W. 742 (1924) ; In re McDade's Estate, 95 Okla. 120, 218 Pac.
532 (1923) (Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction in 269 U. S. 529,
46 Sup. Ct. 16 70 L. ed. 396 (1925)); James v. James, 253 S. W. 1112 (Tex.
Civ. App. 19235.
"0 Cases cited supra notes 15-19; also Houghton et al. v. Dickinson, 196 Mass.
389, 82 N. E. 481 (1907) ; In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P. (2d) 1051(1933) ; Green et al. v. Wilson et al., 112 Okla. 228, 240 Pac. 1051 (1925); Good-
man v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 142 S. E. 412 (1928).2 See Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915, 19 L. R. A. 40 (1892) i In re
Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pac. 976, 6 L. R. A. 594 (1899), affd on rehearing, 22
Pac. 742 (1889), motion to vacate rehearing denied, 22 Pac. 1028 (1889) ; Brisbin
v. Huntington, 128 Iowa 166, 103 -N. W. 144, 5 Ann. Cas. 931 (1905); Allison v.
Bryan, 21 Okla. 557, 97 Pac. 282, 18 L. R. A. (N. s.) 931, 17 Ann. Cas. 468
(1908) ; Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N. D. 376, 79 N. W. 856, 73 Am. St. Rep. 765 (1899).
22197 N. C. 334, 148 S. E. 456, 64 A. L. R. 1121 (1929).
"Now N. C. GENT. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §49-12,




relied on by the claimant was enacted in 1917,25 subsequent to the
marriage of the mother and reputed father of the claimant, but in
Stewart v. Stewart26 this statute, by its express language, was de-
clared retroactive as well as prospective in effect. It would seem that
the North Carolina Court in making its decision in this case could
have safely relied upon the construction given similar statutes in other
jurisdictions without doing violence to the provisions of the statute.
In all probability the decision must have been influenced by the pro-
visions of the two preceding statutes, the first2 7* providing for legiti-
mation by petition of the putative father, and the second 2s* stating
the effects of such legitimation. The Court in Love v. Love2 9 inter-
preted this latter statute 0 to mean that "The word 'only' as used in
this section qualifies the words 'inherit from the father,' and not the
words 'real estate,' thereby limiting the right of inheritance to the
properties of the adopting father, and this is emphasized by the fact
that the remaining part of the sentence provides that the adopted child
is also entitled to the personal estate of his father."3' 1 The position of
the Court in Love v. Loves2 and its reasoning can well be sustained,
but there seems to be no necessity for applying the construction of a
statute,33 which limits the effects of legitimation when that legitimation
is effected by a petition presented to the court by the putative father,
to the following statute3 4 prescribing legitimation by the marriage of
the parents of the bastard. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
by its decision In re Estate of Wallace35 seems to have violated the
intent of the legislature since the act3 6 was entitled "An Act to Legiti-
mate Bastard Children upon the Marriage of their Reputed Father and
'
5 N. C. PuB. L. 1917, c. 219, §1.195 N. C. 476, 142 S. E. 577 (1928).
'". N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §49-10: "Le-
gitimation.-The putative father of any illegitimate child may apply by petition in
writing to the superior court of the county in which he resides, praying that
such child may be declared legitimate; and if it appears that the petitioner is
reputed the father of the child, the court may thereupon declare and pronounce
the child legitimated; and the clerk shall record the decree."
1S* N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §49-11: "Ef-
fects of legitimation.The effect of such legitimation shall extend no further
than to impose upon the father all the obligations which fathers owe to their
lawful children, and to enable the child to inherit from the father only his real
estate, and also to entitle such child to the personal estate of his father, in the
same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. In case of death or in-
testacy, the real and personal estate of such child shall be transmitted and dis-
tributed according to the statute of descents and distribution among those who
would be his heirs and next of kin in case he had been born in lawful wedlock."
"179 N. C. 115, 101 S. E. 562 (1919).
"Supra note 28.
'Love v. Love, 179 N. C. 115, 117, 101 S. E. 562 (1919).
"179 N. C. 115, 101 S. E. 562 (1919).
"Supra note 28.
,Supra note 11.
"197 N. C. 334, 148 S. E. 456, 64 A. L. R. 1121 (1929).
"N. C. Pun. L. 1917, c. 219.
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Mother," and was passed to abrogate the view that a child is either
born a legitimate one or a bastard; at common law the theory being
that "God alone can make the heir, not man."3  It would seem that
in view of the remedial purpose of the enactment, a liberal construction
was intended, but not received.
There is no doubt but that the principal case in its liberal construc-
tion of the legitimation statute stands approved by an overwhelming
majority. The view taken by North Carolina on this question stands
alone and should be corrected by appropriate legislation.
R. I. LIPTON.
Duress-Effect of Threats of Arrest and Imprisonment
on Validity of Contracts
A recent Georgia case' raises one of the problems of duress which
confront the courts. In that case the plaintiff was continually pressed
for three hours to execute a deed to property for a price which she
thought to be inadequate. Finally one of the defendants informed the
plaintiff that she would have to sign the papers or go to jail. This
statement greatly frightened the plaintiff, whereupon she signed the
instrument, still insisting that it was against her will. In the plaintiff's
petition to set aside the deed the court refused to do so, saying that
mere empty threats to arrest, where neither warrant has been issued
nor proceedings commenced, do not amount to duress.
Under the common law duress was divided into two classes: duress
by imprisonment and duress per mihas. Duress by imprisonment
existed where an individual was deprived of his liberty, and duress
per izinas was present where there was a threat to life, limb, or liberty.2*
It is usually held that what constitutes duress is a matter of law, but
whether duress exists in a particular transaction is a matter of fact.8
Under the old common law duress must have been such as would de-
prive a constant and courageous man of his free will, but the modern
tendency is to include all such threats as would overcome the will of
a person of only ordinary firmness.4 Recently some of the courts are
rejecting any objective standard and are simply inquiring whether the
"'See Deik and Robbins, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Chil-
dren: A Comparative Study (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 308 at 318.
'Hoover v. Mobley et al. - Ga. -, 31 S. E. (2d) 9 (1944).
2* l Br_ CoMm.* 131 C". . . there are two sorts (of duress) : duress of im-
prisonment, where a man actually 16ses his liberty . . . , and duress per ininas,
where the hardship is only threatened and impending."); 2 COKE INSTITUTES*
483; see Hatter's Ex'r v. Greenlee, 1 Port. 222, 227, 26 Am. Dec. 370, 373 (Ala.
1834).
' Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495, 47 L. R. A. 417 (1900).
"Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 214, 19 L. ed. 134 (U. S. 1869) ; Bane v. Detrick,
52 Ill. 19 (1869); Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 27 N. E. 1010 (1892).
(Vol. 23
